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Biotechnology’s Great Divide: Strengthening the 
Relationship Between Patent Law and Bioethics 
in the Age of CRISPR-Cas9  
Hannah Mosby* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the 
chemical structure of DNA.1 Less than 40 years later, results of 
the first successful gene editing experiment were published in a 
1991 edition of Science.2 Then, in 2003, the National Human 
Genome Sequencing Consortium released the first complete 
sequence of the human genome.3 In 2015, researchers in China 
published the results of the first known use of gene editing 
technology in human embryos.4 That technology—the gene 
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 1. The Francis Crick Papers, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, NAT’L 
INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/SC/p-
nid/143 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 2. N.P. Pavletich & C.O. Pablo, Zinc Finger-DNA Recognition: Crystal 
Structure of a Zif268-DNA Complex at 2.1 A, 252 SCIENCE 809 (1991); see also 
Genome Editing: A Brief History, ALLELE BIOTECHNOLOGY, http://www 
.allelebiotech.com/genome-editing/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 3. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, 
NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
https://www.genome.gov/11006943/human-genome-project-completion-
frequently-asked-questions/ (last updated Oct. 30, 2010). 
 4. Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human 
Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363 (2015); see also David Cyranoski 
& Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos, 
NATURE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-
genetically-modify-human-embryos-1.17378#/bl. 
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editing system CRISPR-Cas9—is now in preparation for its first 
clinical trial, which is scheduled to commence sometime in 
2018.5 In the 70 years since its conception, the field of 
biotechnology has expanded exponentially, and has produced 
countless innovations that have positively impacted human 
health. Each discovery enables the next, and scientists continue 
to charge forward—patents in tow—on their quest to modify and 
improve human existence. In the face of such a concrete public 
benefit,6 it’s all too easy to forget the ethical shadows looming 
behind many of these biotechnologies. 
Patents function both to fund and incentivize research,7 and 
therefore play a huge role in the development of new technology. 
Yet modern U.S. patent law has long been a stranger to ethics. 
Although the patent prosecution process involves weighing, 
measuring, and challenging virtually every facet of an invention8 
in the name of protecting the “patent bargain,”9 it has not 
involved even the slightest consideration of the invention’s 
ethical, legal, or societal implications since at least the turn of 
the century.10 The Moral Utility Doctrine—a loosely-defined 
nineteenth century common law doctrine that allowed for 
judicial consideration of an invention’s socially or morally 
                                                          
 5. Chelsea Gohd, The First CRISPR Clinical Trial Could Begin in 2018, 
FUTURISM (Dec. 17, 2017), https://futurism.com/first-crispr-clinical-trial/. 
 6. Many of these benefits go unappreciated in twenty-first century life, 
but biotechnology has been responsible for detecting, treating, and curing 
countless diseases. These health science developments—many building on the 
innovations that came before them—have improved the lives of individuals with 
diabetes, genetic diseases, cancers, and many other debilitating or deadly 
conditions. See generally Biotechnology Solutions for Everyday Life, BIOTECH. 
INNOVATION ORG., https://www.bio.org/articles/biotechnology-solutions-
everyday-life (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 8. To receive a patent, an invention must be patent-eligible, useful, novel, 
and nonobvious, in addition to satisfying a host of procedural requirements. See 
generally infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 9. The “patent bargain” metaphor is often used to refer to the quid pro quo 
nature of obtaining a patent, and is generally articulated as follows: a patent is 
a social contract in which the public provides the inventor with a benefit 
(exclusive rights to an invention) in exchange for a benefit (the innovation). See 
generally Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the 
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316–18, 
1328–29 (2004). 
 10. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (holding that inventions cannot be ruled unpatentable for lack of 
utility “simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the 
public.”); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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“injurious” nature11—once filled this void. However, it was 
“inconsistently and sporadically” applied even before its current 
dormancy.12 Further still, the Doctrine was a malleable system 
of ethical regulation, subject to the convictions of individual 
judges and, as such, not often reflective of society as a whole.13 
Thus, whatever vestige of the Moral Utility Doctrine may 
remain available in modern jurisprudence is ill-suited to the 
novel and complex ethical implications of twenty-first century 
technology. 
Nowhere is this deficiency more apparent than in the field 
of biotechnology. Recent biotechnological developments present 
a renewed opportunity to consider the role of ethics in patent 
law, and generate a modern U.S. patent policy that is both more 
appropriate and more responsive.14 For example, gene editing 
technologies—a discrete but representative subset of 
biotechnology—have the potential to eradicate certain diseases, 
but could just as easily be employed to modify to the human 
genome in ways wholly unrelated to disease.15 In particular, the 
                                                          
 11. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 12. Andrew Smith, Monsters at the Patent Office: The Inconsistent 
Conclusions of Moral Utility and the Controversy of Human Cloning, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 159, 161 (2003). 
 13. Common law, in contrast to statutory law, is implemented by judges in 
individual cases, and therefore tends to be less uniform and evolves over time. 
See generally Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law 
Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 
(2008). This, presumably, would be exaggerated in the case of doctrines that 
involve moral and ethical considerations, which are highly personal, varied, and 
volatile. 
 14. Even at its height, the Moral Utility Doctrine was only used to prevent 
patents on inventions like gambling devices and deceptive consumer goods. See 
infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. The ethical concerns that may or may 
not have been present in such devices are vastly different from those present in 
biotechnology (the modification of human genomes, for example), rendering 
existing precedent—if still authoritative—largely inapplicable outside of its 
general premise of judicial ethical oversight. 
 15. One familiar refrain here is the “designer babies” argument, which 
refers to parental ability to select certain traits (hair or eye color, height, or 
perhaps athletic ability) in an embryo prior to implantation. Another 
frequently-cited concern is germline modification, which not only removes the 
genetic variant in all future offspring (eliminating the possibility of future 
individuals’ autonomous choice), but could ultimately lead to a reduction in 
allelic variation in certain populations. For a discussion of these concerns, see 
generally Jessica Berg, Editing Human Embryos with CRISPR Is Moving 
Ahead – Now’s the Time to Work Out the Ethics, THE CONVERSATION (July 28, 
2017), http://theconversation.com/editing-human-embryos-with-crispr-is-
moving-ahead-nows-the-time-to-work-out-the-ethics-81732. 
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CRISPR-Cas9 system has made gene editing faster, cheaper, 
simpler, and more reliable than ever before, thereby expanding 
both the urgency and the public relevance of these complex 
ethical repercussions.16 In the face of technologies like 
CRISPR,17 an opportunity to consider these implications and 
balance them with the technology’s potential public benefit is 
more necessary than ever—in part because of the imminence of 
these ethically undesirable outcomes, but also because 
consideration at the patent prosecution stage provides an 
opportunity to regulate the kind of technologies that often elude 
ex post facto legislation and regulation.18 
This Note argues for strengthening the relationship 
between U.S. patent law and ethics, and proposes a schema for 
utilizing the patent prosecution process as a regulatory 
mechanism for ethically controversial technologies. Part I of this 
Note provides a brief introduction to U.S. patent law, the kinds 
of inventions for which patents can be obtained, and the concept 
of beneficial utility. This section also details the history and 
current status of the Moral Utility Doctrine, and concludes with 
a summary of the current relationship between U.S. patent law 
and ethics. Part II highlights the issues inherent in continuing 
to exclude ethical considerations from the patentability inquiry, 
and discusses potential mechanisms for incorporating those 
considerations moving forward. Finally, this Note concludes by 
presenting a scheme of ethical regulation that utilizes principles 
from the dormant Moral Utility Doctrine, coupled with changes 
to United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) policy, 
in order to minimize the societal risks of technologies like 
CRISPR-Cas9 while continuing to incentivize progress and 
innovation in biotechnology. 
                                                          
 16. See generally infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 17. As is common, this Note will use the term “CRISPR” as shorthand for 
the multi-component CRISPR-Cas9 system. 
 18. Emergent technologies are often difficult to regulate because of the 
delays inherent in the legislative process, which can also affect subsequent 
agency regulation. See generally Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester & 
Kenneth W. Abbot, What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us 
About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. ETHICS 724 (2009) (discussing the 
challenges of regulating emerging technology in the context of nanotechnology). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND 35 
U.S.C. § 101 
Patent law in the United States can be traced to a grant of 
congressional authority in the Constitution itself.19 Acting 
pursuant to this grant, Congress codified the first body of patent 
law—colloquially, the “Patent Act”—in 1790,20 which was 
amended various times until the codification of the recognizably 
modern version in 1952.21 Notions of the concept of 
“patentability,” however, were not incorporated until the 1870 
amendment.22 Patentability—or “subject matter eligibility,” as 
it is sometimes referred to23—is perhaps the most basic 
requirement for obtaining a patent. To be patent-eligible, an 
invention must be a “new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof[.]”24 On its face, the text of § 101 seems 
                                                          
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (delegating to Congress the power to 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times 
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries”) (emphasis added). The presence of this explicit delegation suggests 
that even at the country’s founding, protection of intellectual property was 
recognized as crucial. 
 20. 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 8–293 (1952). 
 22. Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870). Specifically, a 
concept of patentability akin to the current 35 U.S.C. § 101 is found in § 24 of 
the 1870 version, and allows for patents on “any person who has invented or 
discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof[.]” This exact language is 
still used in 35 U.S.C. § 101 today: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title” (emphasis added). See also Daniel 
Cole, Should Section 101 of the Patent Act Be Removed, IP WATCHDOG (June 23, 
2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/23/section-101-patent-act-removed 
/id=70230/ (“Section 101 of the patent act was added in 1870 and amended in 
1952.”). 
 23. This Note will use the terms “subject matter eligibility” and 
“patentability” synonymously, as is typical in practice. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (9th 
ed., rev. Jan. 2018) (using the terms interchangeably throughout examiner 
guidelines) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
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virtually all-encompassing—there is scarcely an invention 
imaginable that would not be patent-eligible.25 
As is often the case with statutory interpretation, however, 
the implicit exceptions to § 101 are substantially more limiting 
than the text itself. Three categorical exceptions to patentability 
have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court: laws of nature, 
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.26 The “law” or 
“phenomenon” of nature exclusion prevents patents such as 
methods of medical treatment based on naturally-occurring 
health correlations,27 or patents on unaltered living organisms.28 
Contrastingly, the abstract idea restriction often arises in cases 
concerning business method patents, which are highly 
                                                          
 25. To further illustrate this sentiment, this Note encourages the reader to 
think about the types of inventions enumerated in the statute—method of 
conducting business would constitute a “process,” any manner of apparatus 
could constitute a “machine or manufacture,” and any molecular creation could 
constitute a “composition of matter.” Id. Is an invention that falls outside of 
these categories even articulable? 
 26. These exceptions were first succinctly articulated in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“This is not to suggest that § 101 has no 
limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”), although the 
Diamond Court does cite earlier decisions as standing for the same proposition. 
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). Further, these categorical exclusions have 
been repeatedly affirmed and re-articulated by the Court in modern 
jurisprudence. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 
U.S. 66, 67 (2012) (holding unpatentable guidelines instructing clinicians to 
“engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity . . . [because such] 
activity is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature 
into a patent-eligible application of such a law.”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“In [Mayo], we set forth a framework 
for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those 
concepts.”) (citation removed); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (“We have long held that this 
provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66, 67 (2012) (holding unpatentable clinician treatment instructions based on 
an observed correlation between the concentration of a particular metabolite 
and drug response). But see Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 
F.3d 1042, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding patentable a method for repeated 
freeze and thaw cycles of liver cells because it was a patent eligible application 
of a law of nature). 
 28. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding 
patentable a bacterium engineered to digest oil products, because it was 
“markedly different” than anything found in nature). 
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controversial.29 All three categories are excluded from 
patentability because there is not enough of an “inventive 
concept” present to warrant bestowing intellectual property 
rights onto the inventor.30 None, however, are excluded on the 
basis of moral or ethical considerations.31 
Other than the recognized judicial exceptions to § 101, there 
exists one notable statutory exception that applies in the realm 
of biotechnology:32 the USPTO cannot grant patents “directed to 
or encompassing a human organism.”33 Aside from being one of 
the only external statutory exceptions to patentability, this 
prohibition is also unique in that it is the only exception based 
on ethical grounds applicable to biotechnology.34 One effect of 
                                                          
 29. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010) (holding that a 
particular business method falls outside of § 101 because it claims an “abstract 
idea”). In Bilski, however, the Court refused to categorically exclude business 
patents because they could, in theory, be encompassed by the “process” 
language of § 101. Id. at 596. 
 30. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 31. Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in 
Biotechnology Patent Law 318 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 57, 
2007) (“U.S. patent law contains no statutory basis for the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) or a court to deny patent protection to morally 
controversial biotech subject matter.”) [hereinafter Bagley, A Global 
Controversy]. 
 32. There are a few other statutory exceptions to patentability—namely, 
for nuclear technology and medical procedures—that do exist (and stem at least 
in part from the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, infra note 66, but they are not germane to the biotechnologies addressed 
in this Note and therefore are not discussed at length herein). See generally 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, 
EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO 
PATENTEES’ RIGHTS (2010), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15 
/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf. 
 33. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 199, 118 
Stat. 3, 101 (2004). This amendment was later codified into the Patent Act itself. 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 
(2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a 
claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”). 
 34. This prohibition stemmed from backlash to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which was the first time the Court held a 
living organism patentable—in this instance, a bacterium. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). However, many individuals became 
concerned that this could lead to the patenting of multi-cellular organisms and, 
eventually, humans, and the USPTO issued a notice afterward that explicitly 
disallowed such patents. Donald J. Quigg, Animals – Patentability, 1077 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 
USPTO Policy], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2013/week53 
/TOCCN/item-137.htm (“A claim directed to or including within its scope a 
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this ethical basis is that an otherwise ineligible invention—one 
which is directed to a human organism—cannot be “cured” by 
integrating it with other, patent-eligible subject matter in the 
same way that other categorically excluded inventions can be.35 
However, it is possible for applicants to circumvent the statute 
by including in their claims a “disclaim[er] [of] any coverage for 
human animals,”36 which renders the prohibition somewhat less 
rigid than it appears on its face. Section 33 is Congress’ only 
legislative action to date in response to public moral and ethical 
concerns surrounding biotechnology and has been met with some 
criticism.37 
Despite sentiments that the arena of patent-eligible subject 
matter is shrinking,38 this “threshold” requirement remains a 
relatively low bar.39 Acknowledging the discrete exceptions 
outlined above, there are no further limitations on the types of 
biotechnological inventions for which a patent can be obtained.40 
Furthermore, even in instances where an invention falls within 
the realm of a particular exception, applicants can often employ 
drafting techniques or modify their inventions to avoid subject 
                                                          
human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. 101.”). 
 35. Dennis Crouch, Patents Encompassing a Human Organism, 
PATENTLYO (Dec. 2, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/ex-parte-
kamrava.html (“One exception to the cured-by-integration rule involves the 
patenting of human organisms. Generally speaking, a patent clam [sic] cannot 
encompasses [sic] a human organism and likewise, a claim encompassing an 
otherwise unpatentable human organism will not become patentable by 
integrating elements that are subject matter eligible.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Ava Caffarini, Directed to or Encompassing a Human 
Organism: How Section 33 of the America Invents Act May Threaten the Future 
of Biotechnology, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 768 (2013). 
 38. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness 
and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the 
Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1289 (2010). 
 39. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010). 
 40. This is not to say that there are no further substantive patent 
requirements—an invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious (among 
other things) in order to sustain a patent. Instead, this Note refers only to 
categorical exclusions from patentability, of which there are few. See Bilski, 561 
U.S. 593 at 594 (“The § 101 eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if a 
claimed invention qualifies in one of the four categories, it must also satisfy ‘the 
conditions and requirements of this title.’”) (citation omitted). 
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matter ineligibility.41 As such, patent-eligible subject matter is 
relatively free of legal, judicial, and regulatory constraints. 
B. THE MORAL UTILITY DOCTRINE 
Since 35 U.S.C. § 101 created an expansive definition of 
patent eligible subject matter, judges once relied on another 
mechanism for regulating the content of patentable inventions: 
the “utility” requirement.42 For an invention to be acceptable on 
utility grounds, it must have a “specific” and “substantial” 
use43—in other words, the invention must “do what is claimed.”44 
This, much like the § 101 subject matter requirement, appears 
on its face to be a relatively easy condition for a patent 
application to satisfy, at least in the modern era.45 
However, historically, many judges recognized a 
“beneficiality” component to the utility requirement, which 
provided an opportunity for judicial regulation of patent-eligible 
subject matter on moral and ethical grounds.46 This 
understanding of utility—sometimes referred to as moral or 
beneficial utility—stems from the Lowell v. Lewis decision in 
1817 which stipulated that an invention could not “be frivolous 
or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of 
society” if it were to receive a patent, per the requirements of 35 
                                                          
 41. See Crouch, supra note 35. 
 42. The “utility” requirement is derived from two places in the Patent Act. 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter”) (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a patent 
application’s specification to describe “the manner and process of making and 
using [the invention]”) (emphasis added). 
 43. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531, 534 (1966). 
 44. Gene Quinn, Understanding the Patent Law Utility Requirement, IP 
WATCHDOG (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/11/07 
/understanding-the-patent-law-utility-requirement/id=63007/. 
 45. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based 
Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007) (“The utility requirement is 
still properly understood as very low and generally presents a low bar to 
patentability.”). However, in the wake of Brenner, many commentators felt that 
the utility requirement had, in fact, been elevated for certain classes of 
inventions. See, e.g., Samantha A. Jameson, The Problems of the Utility 
Analysis in Fisher and its Associated Policy Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE 
L.J. 311, 313 (2006) (“In Brenner . . . the Supreme Court articulated an elevated 
utility standard for research intermediates.”). 
 46. See Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and 
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 488–89 (2003) 
[hereinafter Bagley, Patent First]. 
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U.S.C. § 101.47 This Moral Utility Doctrine served, for a time, as 
a gatekeeper to subject matter eligibility; despite the “utility” 
requirement’s independent existence from the “subject matter 
eligibility” requirement, the two functioned together for the 
purpose of preventing patents on inventions encompassing 
subject matter that did not meet “judicially identified standards 
of morality.”48 
For approximately 150 years, the Moral Utility Doctrine 
precluded patents on immoral and deceptive inventions.49 
However, use of the doctrine substantially declined as time 
passed and societal values shifted.50 In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. 
Orange Bang, Inc.—a case now infamous for triggering the 
decline of the moral utility “requirement”—the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit was tasked with evaluating the 
“usefulness” of a particular style of frozen drink machine, which 
was designed to mimic a different frozen drink machine that was 
more visually appealing to consumers.51 As such, the invention’s 
novelty was its deceptive nature.52 The court held that an 
invention’s deceptiveness should no longer be grounds for patent 
invalidation on the premise of moral utility.53 Further, it 
stipulated that regulating patent issuance on the basis of 
morality fell within the province of the legislature and not the 
judiciary,54 indicating its disapproval for the Moral Utility 
Doctrine as a whole. From that point forward, courts were 
                                                          
 47. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). Although 
Justice Story may have been operating with policy concerns in mind, this 
opinion suggests that he viewed moral utility as a legitimate statutory 
requirement—independent from other types of utility. Id. (“The word ‘useful,’ 
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or 
immoral.”). 
 48. Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31, at 320. 
 49. Id. For example, the Moral Utility Doctrine was regularly used to 
prevent individuals from obtaining patents on gambling devices. See, e.g., 
Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (holding unpatentable a coin-
operated gambling device). 
 50. See generally Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31. 
 51. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
The invention was based on the idea that this particular machine could harness 
the sanitary benefits of one kind of machine while retaining the consumer 
appeal of the other. Id. at 1365–66. 
 52. Id. at 1365–66. 
 53. Id. at 1368. 
 54. Id. (“Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions 
unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness.”). 
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reluctant to invalidate a patent on moral utility grounds—if any 
did at all.55 
Whether any portion of the Moral Utility Doctrine survived 
the era of Juicy Whip is the subject of debate.56 In the face of the 
infamous Rifkin patent application for a human-animal 
chimera57—which was filed in order to draw attention to the 
potential implications of the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision—
the USPTO issued a “media advisory” that “posited that 
‘inventions directed to human/non-human chimera could, under 
certain circumstances, not be patentable because, among other 
things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality 
aspects of the utility requirement.’”58 Regardless of its official 
status, however, the doctrine is rarely—if ever—implicated in 
modern jurisprudence.59 This dormancy continues today, even in 
the face of patents on extremely controversial biotechnology. 
                                                          
 55. In terms of precedential weight, the Juicy Whip decision may only have 
applied to allegedly deceptive inventions, which would indicate that other kinds 
of scandalous or immoral inventions were still subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Regardless of its actual status, the doctrine is no longer invoked. See Bagley, A 
Global Controversy, supra note 31; infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 56. There exists substantial uncertainty surrounding the USPTO’s current 
view of the Moral Utility Doctrine, particularly since no direct statement has 
been made on its status. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 161 (“However, the 
court’s refusal to invalidate the idea of moral utility altogether might signal 
that the doctrine could be applied in other circumstances, or perhaps, in other 
patentable subject areas.”). But see MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.03(a) (“A 
rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 for lack of utility should not be based on grounds 
that the invention is frivolous, fraudulent or against public policy.”). This 
inclusion in the MPEP seems to indicate that the USPTO does not support the 
use of moral utility as grounds for invalidation, although it has not advocated 
this viewpoint in a more public capacity. 
 57. The Rifkin patent application sparked extensive debate, as intended. 
See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics 
/1998/04/02/patent-sought-on-making-of-part-human-creatures/43e25926-
4749-4a12-a342-49678eb2f189/?utm_term=.39ae53be138d. 
 58. Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31, at 321 (quoting the 
USPTO’s Media Advisory); see also Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 
1, 1998). However, the author notes that the USPTO has since admitted that it 
is “without authority” to deny a patent on morality grounds. Id. 
 59. See Omar Khan & Richard Crudo, Scandalous, Immoral and 
Disparaging Patents in Light of Tam, LAW 360 (Feb. 25, 2016, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/761308/scandalous-immoral-and-
disparaging-patents-in-light-of-tam (“[C]ases denying the protection of the law 
on the ground of immorality are not of this generation . . . .”) (quoting John 
Gladstone Mills III et al., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 11:5 (2015)). After this 
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C. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO ETHICAL REGULATION OF 
PATENTS 
The U.S. approach to the relationship between ethics and 
patent law is not the only approach—nor, perhaps, even the most 
internationally popular. Doctrines similar to moral utility exist 
in many other jurisdictions.60 For example, Europe issued the 
Directive 98/44/EC (“European Biotech Directive”) in 1988 in 
order to respond to changing ethical concerns brought on by the 
rise of patents on biotechnology.61 This extensive directive is a 
much less flexible approach to regulation than common law but 
clearly stipulates “what is patentable and what is not.”62 
Contrastingly—and in a manner perhaps more reminiscent of 
the Moral Utility Doctrine—China has instituted a blanket 
prohibition on granting patents for “invention-creations that 
violate the law or social ethics, or harm public interests.”63 
Although these regulations have been met with some criticism,64 
                                                          
decision was issued by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court heard an appeal 
and held that intellectual property rights cannot be denied on the basis of the 
property’s “disparaging” character, citing free speech concerns. Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753–54 (2017). Notably, in this case the Court was addressing 
a different kind of intellectual property—trademarks, not patents—and 
interpreting the Lanham Act. Therefore, its analysis does not apply to the 
context of patent law, even if one were to equate disparagement with ethical 
affront. Some iteration of this principle could eventually be applied to patents, 
but without authoritative remarks from the Supreme Court on the issue this 
Note proceeds under the justified assumption that Tam is limited in scope to 
trademark law only. 
 60. In other countries, the doctrine is called ordre public, which functions 
similarly to the defunct Moral Utility Doctrine by allowing judicial oversight in 
the patent process. See Joseph Strauss, Ordre Public and Morality Issues in 
Patent Eligibility, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013); Khan & Crudo, supra note 59. 
 61. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. 
(L 213) 13–21. 
 62. Rob J. Aerts, The Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions in the EU, 
the Judicial Bodies Involved and the Objectives of the EU Legislator, EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 88 (2014); see also id. at 18–19. 
 63. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985, 
revised Dec. 27, 2008), art. 5, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws 
/en/cn/cn028en.pdf (“Patent rights shall not be granted for invention-creations 
that violate the law or social ethics, or harm public interests.”). 
 64. One set of critics of the European Biotech Directive are agriculturalists, 
because of the restrictions that the directive places on the patenting of live 
plants. See, e.g., BAVARIAN FARMER’S ASS’N, Criticism of EU’s Bio-Patent 
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they provide examples of the various mechanisms by which 
ethical considerations can play a functional role in the 
patentability inquiry. 
In addition to the varying approaches to ethical governance 
utilized by other jurisdictions, certain frameworks exist within 
international patent law—however limited that may be. 
Multiple international intellectual property agreements 
recognize morality exceptions to patent subject matter 
eligibility.65 One example is the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), 
which allows member countries to exclude from patentability 
certain inventions, in order “to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”66 Additionally, the 
European Patent Convention (“EPC”) requires its member 
countries to exclude patents that would be “contrary to ‘ordre 
public’ or morality.”67 The approaches in international treaties 
may differ, but each indicates at least the recognition of the role 
that moral and ethical concerns could play in the signatories’ 
patent process. 
D. MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY AS A UNIQUE ETHICAL HAZARD 
Biotechnology constitutes an increasingly large proportion 
of patented inventions—and often produces some of the most 
high-profile and lucrative patents.68 Additionally, this 
                                                          
Directive, FRESH PLAZA (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.freshplaza.com 
/article/152706/Criticism-of-EUs-bio-patent-directive. 
 65. Importantly, some of these are requirements, while others are 
allowances. In the case of a requirement, member countries must prohibit 
certain types of patents, whereas in instances of an allowance, countries are not 
required to incorporate any ethical regulation—they are simply allowed to do 
so if they choose. 
 66. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 67. The European Patent Convention art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 
199 (revised at the Convention on the Grant of European Patents Nov. 29, 200). 
This morality exception can be viewed as an extension of the ordre public 
doctrine, which itself has been implemented by the European Patent Office in 
a manner very similar to the historical treatment of the Moral Utility Doctrine 
in the U.S. See also Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, EUR. PAT. OFF. (July 27, 
2016), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2016/e/clr_i_b 
_2_2_2_b.htm. 
 68. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Who Owns the Biggest Biotech Discovery of 
the Century?, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.technologyreview 
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technology carries with it unprecedented ethical concerns69 that 
will continue to expand as knowledge grows and techniques 
mature. The boundaries of what exactly qualifies as 
biotechnology, however, can be difficult to discern. Typically, 
definitions center on an element of “manipulation” of some sort 
of natural product.70 These definitions traditionally encompass 
technology ranging from agricultural products to medical 
devices. 
One category of biotechnology often at the forefront of public 
discourse is gene editing technology, making it an illustrative 
context in which to discuss the relationship between ethics and 
patent law.71 The term “gene editing” refers to the family of 
methods that can alter the chemical structure of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).72 DNA is a molecule found in every 
living cell that contains the biological information required to 
make proteins, which are required to sustain life.73 By altering 
                                                          
.com/s/532796/who-owns-the-biggest-biotech-discovery-of-the-century/ 
(discussing the three-party patent dispute over CRISPR-Cas9). 
 69. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, The 5 Most Pressing Ethical Issues in Biotech 
Medicine, BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 41 (2004) (addressing stem cell 
research, privacy concerns, and bioterrorism, among other concerns). 
 70. Merriam-Webster defines “biotechnology” as “the manipulation (as 
through genetic engineering) of living organisms or their components to produce 
useful usually commercial products (such as pest resistant crops, new bacterial 
strains, or novel pharmaceuticals); also: any of various applications of biological 
science used in such manipulation.” Biotechnology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE 
DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary 
/biotechnology. 
 71. Biotechnology spans a variety of applications and subject matter, all of 
which possess their own set of ethical implications. Therefore, in an effort to 
present a concise and meaningful analysis, this Note uses gene editing 
technologies as a representative subset of biotechnology with clear ethical 
implications. Specifically, this Note focuses on the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing 
system because of both its public attention and its widespread use. Further, in 
confining its discussion to one exemplary technology, this Note attempts to 
provide a real-world illustration of the implications of a continued failure to 
incorporate ethical considerations into U.S. patent law, and, later, the benefits 
of the proposed system of regulation. 
 72. Merriam-Webster defines “gene editing” as “the use of biotechnological 
techniques to make changes to specific DNA sequences in the genome of a living 
organism.” Gene Editing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gene%20editing. As such, gene 
editing technologies would be devices and processes that implement gene 
editing techniques. See generally Gene Editing, HORIZON (2017), 
https://www.horizondiscovery.com/gene-editing [hereinafter, HORIZON]. 
 73. See generally What Is DNA?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, NAT’L 
INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 20, 2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna; 
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the structure of this molecule—specifically, the order of 
nucleotides, or “base pairs”—scientists can change the 
characteristics of the protein that ultimately results.74 As such, 
gene editing can, in theory, remedy many clinical conditions for 
which there is an underlying genetic cause.75 
Gene editing technologies can be divided into four types, 
based on their mechanisms of action: zinc finger nucleases 
(“ZFNs”), transcription activator-like effector nucleases 
(“TALENs”), meganucleases, and CRISPR-Cas9.76 All four 
operate by inducing a natural cellular repair mechanism 
designed to repair breakages in DNA.77 The first three of these 
technologies—ZFNs, TALENs, and meganucleases—are less 
precise and more labor intensive than the CRISPR-Cas9 
system,78 making CRISPR a much more attractive option to 
many individuals. As such, the highly accurate and relatively 
                                                          
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/25520880/ (last updated June 16, 2015). 
 74. See HORIZON, supra note 72. Changing the order of base pairs will 
change the order of amino acids that are joined during the process of 
translation. Consequently, these new amino acids alter the characteristics of 
the resulting protein through changes in molecular folding. 
 75. To be sure, this is not the only function of gene editing (though the 
medicinal applications of gene editing are frequently touted as the most 
exciting). Gene editing technology also has a vast array of other applications, 
ranging from agriculture to hormone production. See generally Sarah Holme, 
CRISPR: Emerging Applications for Genome Editing Technology, GENOMICS 
RES. (June 26, 2017), https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/articles 
/crispr-emerging-applications-for-genome-editing-technology-288978. 
 76. Morgan Maeder & Charles Gersbach, Genome-Editing Technologies for 
Gene and Cell Therapy, MOLECULAR THERAPY 430, 432 (2016). These 
technologies are listed in their order of discovery, with ZFNs being the most 
established and CRISPR-Cas9 being the most recently discovered. 
 77. The cellular mechanism referred to here is homology-directed repair. 
Id. at 430. This mechanism operates to repair breakage by using a second 
homologous strand as a “template” for nucleotide insertion. By inducing DNA 
breakage at certain points, gene editing technologies can remove and insert 
particular base pairs, ultimately altering the protein for which the targeted 
DNA codes. 
 78. Tomislav Meštrović, How Does CRISPR Compare to Other Gene-
Editing Techniques?, NEWS MED. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.news-
medical.net/life-sciences/How-Does-CRISPR-Compare-to-Other-Gene-Editing-
Techniques.aspx (“CRISPR/Cas technology has entered the picture as the 
faster, more straightforward and affordable way for genome-editing in 
comparison to traditional ZFN and TALENs approaches.”). 
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inexpensive nature of CRISPR-Cas9 made its discovery a 
monumental scientific development.79 
Important in the celebration of the CRISPR system’s 
strengths and positive implications, however, is consideration of 
the ethical concerns that its accessibility may bring. CRISPR has 
enormous potential to be used in ways society may not be 
prepared to condone, particularly in the context of human 
germline editing (where the changes made to DNA would be 
passed down to that individual’s offspring).80 In addition to 
questions about equitable access and informed consent, many 
individuals have a viscerally negative reaction to the use of gene 
editing in human embryos for moral or religious reasons.81 
Further, although the CRISPR system is safer and more 
accurate than its predecessors, there remain serious doubts 
about the accuracy and reliability of gene editing in a healthcare 
                                                          
 79. There are three inventors vying for ultimate ownership of the CRISPR-
Cas9 system, and, therefore, the credit for this enormous scientific innovation. 
All three have been awarded in some manner for their contribution to the field 
of genetics. See, e.g., Doudna and Charpentier Receive 2017 Japan Prize for 
CRISPR Contribution, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/doudna-and-charpentier-
receive-2017-japan-prize-for-crispr-contribution/81253814/; CRISPR Pioneer 
Awarded $500,000 Lemelson-MIT Prize, GENOMICS RES. (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/news/gene-editing-technology-
developer-awarded-500000-lemelson-mit-prize-291932. 
 80. See Genome Editing: What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome 
Editing?, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.genome 
.gov/27569225/what-are-the-ethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/. The 
central concern in the context of germline editing is that one individual—the 
one choosing to engage in gene editing—is thereby making a choice that is 
enormously consequential for future individuals. This may be less of a concern 
for some when editing is for solely therapeutic purposes—in other words, to 
correct a genetic disease—but bioethicists recognize that this creates a “slippery 
slope” toward non-therapeutic (sometimes called “enhancement”) uses. Id.; see 
also David Masci, Human Enhancement: The Scientific and Ethical Dimensions 
of Striving for Perfection, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2016), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/essay/human-enhancement-the-scientific-and-
ethical-dimensions-of-striving-for-perfection/. 
 81. Genome Editing, supra note 80. Embryonic research is a likely 
predecessor to widespread clinical use, and therefore negative reactions from 
the public to such research is likely to slow progress toward therapeutic 
implementation. 
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setting.82 In light of these concerns, clinical use has been widely 
discouraged by bioethicists until further research is conducted.83 
In addition to healthcare-related issues, commentators have 
noted that CRISPR’s significant desirability over other gene 
editing technologies gives it the potential to produce dramatic 
monopoly effects if patent protected.84 The accessibility of 
CRISPR has also increased public interest and media attention, 
which only heightens the potential for its misuse.85 Finally, 
many entities have expressed concerns over the speed with 
which CRISPR has been implemented and adapted, which has 
far outpaced any potential regulatory systems.86 Ultimately, 
although gene editing in the age of CRISPR-Cas9 has the 
potential for immense public benefit, the corresponding ethical 
considerations may hinder stakeholder benefit and public 
perception if not adequately acknowledged. 
E. EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON GENE EDITING: WHAT ARE THE 
RULES, AND WHO ARE THE RULEMAKERS? 
Although ethics does not play a role in the U.S. patent 
process, it does play some role in other areas of law affecting 
                                                          
 82. Id. These safety concerns arise from the potential to induce unintended 
changes in an individual’s DNA, such as “off-target effects (edits in the wrong 
place) and mosaicism (when some cells carry the edit but others do not).” Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. John J. Mulvihill et al., Ethical Issues of CRISPR Technology and Gene 
Editing Through the Lens of Solidarity, 122 BRIT. MED. BULL. 17, 25 (2017) 
(“The idea that a powerful technology, such as CRISPR-Cas9 and the guide 
DNA can be patented and therefore become the exclusive property of a 
researcher [or their institution] is part of this debate. If the technology, which 
was isolated from naturally occurring bacteria [and not invented], can be 
proprietary, then many people could be denied access to its benefits outside 
market mechanisms.”). A potential counter-argument to the notion of monopoly 
effects is inherent in the ongoing CRISPR patent battle: if three entities can 
claim credit for at least a portion of the CRISPR discovery, can a true monopoly 
exist? However, a limited number of individuals controlling a highly impactful 
technology could produce monopoly-like effects, even though more than one 
entity controls the technology. See Ryan C. Fuhrmann, 3 Groups of Companies 
That Are Almost a Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0911/3-groups-of-companies-that-
are-almost-a-monopoly.aspx (providing various examples of “near monopoly 
conditions”). Further, if the patent battle continues to engender hostility 
between the patent holders, it could ultimately affect their willingness to 
engage in licensing. 
 85. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 1 (2017). 
 86. Id. 
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biotechnology. Current restrictions on gene editing can be 
divided into two central categories: funding restrictions and 
market restrictions.87 In the case of funding restrictions, entities 
like the National Institutes of Health (NIH) make research 
grants contingent on adherence to certain conditions, some of 
which have ethical bases.88 Contrastingly, Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulations occur later in a technology’s 
life cycle and are predominantly based on product safety, rather 
than ethical, concerns.89 
The NIH provides a significant portion of the funding for 
research that ultimately results in biotechnologies.90 Long 
before modern gene editing techniques existed, the Office of 
Science Policy created the Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (RAC),91 which “provides recommendations to the 
NIH Director related to basic and clinical research involving 
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.”92 These 
recommendations shape NIH policy with respect to developing 
genetic technologies, of which gene editing is no exception. At 
                                                          
 87. These categories encompass only actual legal restrictions, and not 
ethical guidelines. For example, the National Academy of Science promulgates 
consensus reports on the ethics of gene editing research. See HUMAN GENOME 
EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 85; see also Report 
Highlights, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. & NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. (2017), 
http://nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/genesite/documents/webpage/gene_177
260.pdf (“Do not proceed at this time with human genome editing for purposes 
other than treatment or prevention of disease and disability” and “[e]ncourage 
public discussion and policy debate with respect to somatic human genome 
editing for uses other than treatment or prevention of disease and disability.”). 
 88. Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing 
Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INSTS.OF HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-
nih-funding-research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos. 
 89. Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalubola, FDA’s Science-Based Approach to 
Genome Edited Products, FDA VOICE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/01/fdas-science-based-approach-
to-genome-edited-products/. This is not to say, however, that the FDA does not 
recognize that “larger societal considerations should not be overlooked.” Id. 
 90. RESEARCH AM., U.S. INVESTMENTS IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2013–2015 3–4, https://www.researchamerica 
.org/sites/default/files/2016US_Invest_R%26D_report.pdf (describing how the 
federal government provided 22.62% of the funding required for U.S. medical 
research, over 82% of which comes from the NIH). 
 91. Nelson A. Wivel, Historical Perspectives Pertaining to the NIH 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, 25 HUMAN GENE THERAPY 19, 19 
(2014). 
 92. Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/recombinant-dna-advisory-committee/. 
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the recommendation of the RAC,93 the NIH categorically refuses 
to approve funding for research that incorporates the genetic 
modification of human embryos. 94 This—coupled with the 
longstanding federal prohibition on research in which human 
embryos are “destroyed”95 —serves as a considerable barrier to 
gene editing research and technology development. 
In addition to being subject to certain funding restrictions, 
biotechnology is also highly regulated in the marketplace. In 
instances where gene editing products are targeted for use in 
humans, they are “regulated under [the FDA’s] existing 
framework for biological products,” which funnels hopeful 
technologies through the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (CBER).96 Notably, the FDA does not currently 
approve therapies involving human germline editing.97 
However, in conjunction with the NIH and the RAC, the FDA 
recently approved the first “clinical protocol” involving the use 
of CRISPR-Cas9 in human somatic cells.98 Ultimately, the FDA 
has appeared to express some hesitancy in regard to the safety 
of gene editing products, but it has not extensively addressed the 
ethical concerns related to these technologies. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The relationship between U.S. patent law and ethics has 
remained stagnant since the decline of the Moral Utility 
Doctrine,99 despite contrasting approaches in other jurisdictions 
and internationally.100 After the Federal Circuit’s criticism of the 
doctrine in Juicy Whip and its suggestion that the legislature is 
the appropriate entity to engender a system of ethical regulation 
                                                          
 93. Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing 
Technologies in Human Embryos, supra note 88 (“[The Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee] will not at present entertain proposals for germ line 
alteration.”). 
 94. Eric S. Lander, Brave New Genome, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 5, 7 (2015); see 
also Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing Technologies 
in Human Embryos, supra note 88. 
 95. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 
Stat. 26, 34 (1996) (the “Dickey-Wicker Amendment”). 
 96. Califf & Nalubola, supra note 89. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31. 
 100. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
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in patent law,101 the judicial system has remained virtually 
silent on the subject. Further, other than incorporating a 
discrete prohibition on patents directed to “human organisms” 
in its most recent articulation of the Patent Act,102 the 
legislature has also failed to provide definite guidance.103 The 
same is true of the USPTO itself.104 As such, existing U.S. patent 
law has no opportunity for ethical consideration whatsoever, 
despite the novel and controversial implications of many 
emerging biotechnologies. 
A. OPPOSITES ATTRACT: WHY ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE A 
PLACE IN PATENT LAW 
 The time has come for us, as a society, to clarify the 
relationship between patent law and ethics. The current state of 
passivity—a combination of the uncertain status of the Moral 
Utility Doctrine, congressional silence, and USPTO avoidance—
has masked a unique opportunity for society to voice its opinion 
on new technologies by using patent protection to support only 
those that provide a net benefit. Further, utilizing patent 
prosecution as a means of ethical regulation is superior to any 
potential ex post facto regulation scheme, because it is both more 
timely and more flexible. 
1. Patents as a Social Contract 
Patents are a contract between two entities: the inventor 
and the rest of society.105 This contract is implicit in the Patent 
Act—there are certain requirements that an invention must 
meet in order to qualify for patent protection, and certain 
benefits an inventor can receive if the invention meets those 
requirements. This ensures that an invention provides a true 
benefit to society, while the protection conferred—the exclusive 
right to make and use an invention for a period of 20 years—
                                                          
 101. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); see supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
 102. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 33, 125 Stat. 
284, 340 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may 
issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”). 
 103. Bagley, Patent First, supra note 47, at 478–79. 
 104. Id. at 477–78. 
 105. This concept is sometimes called the “bargain metaphor.” See supra 
note 9 and accompanying text. 
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incentivizes inventors to invent.106 When a balance is 
appropriately struck, it creates a cycle that benefits both classes 
of participants—a feature responsible for much of the allure of a 
patent system. 
Necessarily implicit in this system is society’s approval of 
those inventions that receive patent protection. These 
inventions—in theory—provide enough public benefit to 
warrant bestowing legal protection thereon,107 and so society has 
inherently condoned both their existence and use.108 A problem 
arises, however, when the potentially harmful implications of a 
technology are not adequately weighed against its potential 
benefits—or, worse yet, aren’t even considered in the bargaining 
process. In a system of patent law with no opportunity to 
consider ethical implications, it is impossible to ensure that the 
public is truly receiving a net benefit in exchange for the 
inventor’s “limited monopoly.”109 
Biotechnologies like the CRISPR-Cas9 system raise the 
stakes of the patent bargain, both negatively and positively. 
These technologies are incredibly attractive because of their 
potential for immense public health benefit,110 and therefore 
appear to more than justify their “congressionally mandated 
price.”111 However, the negative implications of these 
technologies—and their potential for misuse—are also 
heightened because of their accessibility, and the presence of 
                                                          
 106. See generally Ghosh, supra note 9, at 1321–30. 
 107. Id. at 1320 (“In 1966, in Brenner v. Manson, the Court redefined the 
quid pro quo as ‘the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility.’”) (citation omitted). 
 108. In a representative democracy like the U.S., society elects political 
leaders, who in turn create legislation and policy to reflect the needs of society. 
Therefore, by way of Congress’ passage of the Patent Act and the terms 
contained therein, society has bestowed its seal of approval on the terms of the 
patent bargain. This Note, of course, recognizes that legislation is not always a 
perfect reflection of the values of constituents, but that it is at least 
representative of those values is a necessary assumption in representative 
democracy. 
 109. Id. at 1320 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 161 (1989)). 
 110. See, e.g., Eliza Barclay, Scientists Successfully Used CRISPR to Fix a 
Mutation That Causes Disease. This Is Huge., VOX (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/2/16083300/crispr-heart-
disease. 
 111. Bonito Boats, 897 U.S. at 152. The “price” referred to here is the 
potential monopoly effect on consumers that stems from a patentee’s 
exclusionary rights. 
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limited governmental oversight in many research processes.112 
To be sure, it is entirely possible that the benefits of technologies 
like CRISPR outweigh hypothetical notions of ethical offense, or 
that the public is willing to accept the associated risks. But if 
there is no opportunity for these implications to even be 
considered during patent law’s intrinsic “negotiation,” can it 
realistically be characterized it as a fair bargain? 
If we continue to sacrifice the opportunity to analyze these 
ethical issues during patent prosecution, we forego an 
opportunity for public input into a process where the public is a 
direct stakeholder. Although it is inarguably complicated by 
politics and attenuated by the U.S. democratic system,113 the 
legislative process provides at least some opportunity for public 
input.114 Since Patent Act legislation articulates the parameters 
of the patent bargain and defines the terms of this social 
contract, refusing an opportunity to fully consider the ethical, 
legal, and societal implications of emerging biotechnologies at 
this stage limits the opportunity for the public to weigh in 
innovations that will shape their future for years to come. 
2. Existing Governance Is an Insufficient Ethical Regulatory 
Mechanism for Emerging Biotechnologies 
Emerging technologies are inherently challenging to 
regulate because they are both difficult for the non-scientific 
public to understand and rapidly evolving, particularly in the 
early stages of their development.115 Existing restrictions on 
controversial biotechnology are inadequate regulatory 
mechanisms because of their limited reach and temporally 
inappropriate relationship to research. Instead, an effective 
regulatory scheme must be both expansive and readily 
responsive. The patent prosecution process presents a unique 
opportunity for proactive ethical regulation that would mitigate 
                                                          
 112. See Genome Editing: What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome 
Editing?, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www 
.genome.gov/27569225/what-are-the-ethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/. 
 113. See generally supra note 108. 
 114. See generally Karen S. Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo, The Right of 
Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of the Legislature 
in the Promotion of this Right, 19 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L LAW 1, 1 (2008) 
(“By definition, a democratic nation has some mechanism through which 
leaders hear from the people.”). 
 115. See Carolyn Abbot, Bridging the Gap—Non-State Actors and the 
Challenges of Regulating New Technology, 39 J.L. SOC. 329, 357 (2012). 
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many of the issues associated with playing a game of regulatory 
“catch-up” to these influential technologies. 
Existing infrastructure is insufficient—standing alone—to 
serve as an ethical regulatory scheme for developing 
biotechnology. Restricting access to funding undoubtedly 
discourages some prospective researchers, but does not alone 
provide a sufficient disincentive. Although a portion of 
healthcare research funding comes from federal sources, the 
largest portion comes from industry116—where grant restrictions 
are irrelevant. Therefore, research into ethically questionable 
technologies can continue unheeded in the majority of instances. 
For example, in 2017, researchers in Portland, Oregon 
announced that they had “successfully modified the genetic 
material of a human embryo” using CRISPR technology.117 This 
research occurred despite NIH and RAC disapproval—as well as 
public skepticism118—and is likely to become more common as 
CRISPR technology matures. Clearly, funding restriction has 
not proven to be an adequate mechanism for voicing 
governmental or societal opinions on the use of these 
technologies.119 
Further, although FDA regulation does prevent products 
from entering mainstream clinical use—thereby somewhat 
mitigating their safety risk to consumers—FDA action occurs too 
late in a technology’s lifecycle to be an effective means of ethical 
regulation.120 By the time a technology has reached the FDA 
                                                          
 116. RES. AMERICA, supra note 90, at 2 (“Industry invested more in R&D 
than any other sector, totaling $102.7 billion.”). 
 117. Berg, supra note 15. 
 118. Cary Funk, Americans Divided on Gene Editing, with Parents of Minors 
More Wary, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/08/americans-divided-on-gene-editing-with-parents-of-minors-
more-wary/. 
 119. The logical counter-argument here is that the refusal of patent 
protection also would not completely eliminate the use of these technologies, 
because not every technology is patented. This is absolutely correct, and this 
Note does not purport to advocate completely prohibiting research into 
technologies that carry ethical controversy. However, because a patent is a 
social bargain, patent law is an important opportunity to voice public opinion. 
This is the case even if research and further development into a technology 
continues without patent protection. The patent process does not have to be the 
exclusive mechanism of ethical regulation—there would need to continue to be 
some market regulation from entities like the FDA—but should be at least a 
component of any regulatory scheme. 
 120. There is also an argument to be made that the FDA does not—and 
should not—base its product regulation on anything other than safety. See 
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application stage, extensive research has already been 
conducted121 and, therefore, many ethically questionable events 
may have already occurred. In contrast, patent prosecution 
occurs at an ideal point in a technology’s life cycle for regulation: 
early enough to mitigate the risk of unethical use, but late 
enough to allow future applications of a technology to be 
somewhat apparent.122 This temporal relationship is unique to 
patent law, and resolves many issues inherent in an exclusively 
retroactive system like FDA regulation. 
Incorporating ethical regulation into patent prosecution is 
also superior to industry self-governance in many ways. 
Although proponents often assert that self-regulation is a 
desirable mechanism because an inventor—or, in a broader 
sense, the industry in which the inventor operates—is the most 
familiar with the ethical risks associated with a technology, 
often the direct effect of this “regulation” is a simple “warding off 
more direct government intervention.”123 Although inventor 
discretion in the licensing process does provide some means of 
self-regulation—including in the case of CRISPR itself124—it 
                                                          
Califf & Nalubola, supra note 89 and accompanying text. Undoubtedly, entities 
like the RAC and the National Academy of Sciences are better-positioned to 
make complex bioethical decisions. See generally notes 87, 92, and 93. 
 121. To begin approval proceedings, manufacturers must submit “scientific 
and clinical data.” About CBER, FDA (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTo
bacco/CBER/ucm123340.htm. To have data available to submit, those 
manufacturers have necessarily engaged in extensive preliminary research 
activities. 
 122. In contrast to regulation at the product approval stage, attempting to 
implement regulation in the basic—or preliminary—stages of research could 
prove inefficient, because many of the future uses of a technology may not be 
apparent at that stage. For a brief overview of product development in the 
healthcare sector, see Product Development: Positioning New Healthcare 
Products in the Marketplace, MARS (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.marsdd.com/mars-library/product-development-positioning-new-
healthcare-products-in-the-marketplace/. 
 123. Abbot, supra note 115, at 345. 
 124. See Christi Guerrini et al., The Rise of the Ethical License, NATURE 
BIOTECH. 22, 22 (2017) (describing how patent licensing allows inventors to self-
regulate, by “restrict[ing] socially controversial applications of a technology”). 
The Broad Institute—one holder of a patent on the CRISPR-Cas9 technology—
has undertaken the licensing process “on terms intended to benefit a party not 
at the negotiating table: the public.” Id. The Institute has recently licensed its 
patent to Monsanto, but provided the licensee with restrictions that prohibit 
the company from: “(i) performing gene drives that spread altered genes quickly 
through populations, which can alter ecosystems; (ii) creating sterile 
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would be unwise for the public to rely exclusively on individual 
restraint in the face of technologies with such potentially large 
public health effects. Further, in addition to the potential for 
case-by-case variance in the restraint actually exercised by 
individual patent holders and industries,125 enormous monetary 
incentives are often at play for the owners of these influential 
technologies.126 Undeniably, profits of this size could cloud a self-
regulator’s judgment. Therefore, self-regulation—though a 
desirable component of or complement to an ethical regulatory 
scheme127—is an insufficient regulatory mechanism when 
standing alone. 
As a whole, addressing ethical concerns during the patent 
process is a far more consistent, tailored, and efficient manner 
in which to regulate biotechnology. Funding restrictions only 
affect the subset of technologies that utilize the particular 
funding mechanism, whereas patent law reaches a much larger 
                                                          
‘terminator’ seeds, which would impose a serious financial burden on farmers 
who would be forced to buy them each year; and (iii) conducting research 
directed to the commercialization of tobacco products, which might increase the 
public health burden of smoking.” Id.; see also Sharon Begley, Monsanto 
Licenses CRISPR Technology to Modify Crops — With Key Restrictions, STAT 
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/22/monsanto-licenses-
crispr/. 
 125. This case-by-case variance is also the reason it is unrealistic to expect 
the majority of developers to abide by the ethical guidelines promulgated by 
entities like the National Academy of Sciences. See supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. Since these recommendations do not have the force of law—
or any force at all, outside of their role in developing grant restriction policies—
researchers have little to no real incentive to abide by them. 
 126. The monetary implications of potentially-patentable biotechnologies 
are often exorbitant. For example, CRISPR-Cas9 has already generated billions 
of dollars for its patent holders. Katrina Megget, Money from Genes: CRISPR 
Goes Commercial, SCI. AM. (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com 
/article/money-from-genes-crispr-goes-commercial/ (“Caribou, founded by 
Crispr pioneer Jennifer Doudna, has raised $15 million; Crispr Therapeutics, 
set up by Charpentier, has raised $89 million since April 2014, plus $105 million 
through the deal with Vertex; and Editas, founded by current Crispr patent 
holder Feng Zhang, has brought in more than $160 million.”) Of note, these 
figures are from early 2016, and therefore the amount of revenue that has 
actually been generated to date is likely much higher. Incorporating ethical 
considerations in the licensing process may serve an inventor’s own moral 
framework, but refusal certainly hinders monetary potential. Therefore, it is 
unrealistic to expect inventors to exercise this sort of discretion with any 
regularity. 
 127. Abbot, supra note 115, at 344–45. 
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number of potentially threatening technologies.128 Additionally, 
because inventions are evaluated by a USPTO examiner on a 
case-by-case basis,129 ethical regulation during the patent 
prosecution process would be highly individualized. This is 
enormously beneficial because the ethical issues presented by a 
biotechnology can vary widely based on its unique implications, 
rates of accuracy, and potential for misuse. Finally, 
consideration of the ethical implications would occur soon after 
the development of the technology,130 which would allow an 
external assessment of the ethical risks to be made clear to the 
inventor early in the research process. Together, these features 
make patent law an incredibly advantageous ethical regulatory 
mechanism. 
B. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCHEMES 
Incorporating some ethical considerations into the patent 
prosecution process is both necessary and justified, and there are 
two principle tools available for crafting a potential regulatory 
scheme: statutory change and common law revival.131 While a 
statutory change is likely to produce more consistent outcomes 
across technologies, there are drawbacks to rigid legislative 
                                                          
 128. Since patents are so commercially desirable, any inventor that can 
obtain a patent typically chooses to seek one. See Megget, supra note 126. This 
creates an incentive for inventors to subject themselves to the attached ethical 
regulation regardless of their funding source. 
 129. See generally Patent Process Overview, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-
applications/utility-patent/patent-process-0 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) 
(outlining patent application process and noting that USPTO reviews the 
application once submitted). 
 130. Since novelty and non-obviousness are both requirements that depend 
on a lack of the same or similar inventions, an inventor is usually best served 
by seeking to obtain a patent as early as his or her invention can satisfy the 
relevant requirements. Therefore, patents are typically sought as early as 
possible in the inventive process. 
 131. Of course, both kinds of changes would also necessitate changes to 
USPTO, as articulated in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), 
because of the USPTO’s agency status. See generally About Us, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) 
(“The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the federal 
agency for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks. In doing this, the 
USPTO fulfills the mandate of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution 
that the legislative branch ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.’”). See generally MPEP, supra note 23. 
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change like stagnancy, or over-inclusiveness. Similarly, 
although common law provides the flexibility necessary to 
appropriately evaluate varying technologies, awakening the 
Moral Utility Doctrine from its state of dormancy would revive 
many of the negative characteristics associated with its demise. 
1. Federal Statutory Changes Promote Uniformity, but 
Minimize Flexibility 
An amendment or addition to the Patent Act would provide 
a concrete opportunity for ethical consideration in the patent 
process, and potential overbreadth or under-inclusiveness could 
be minimized if the amendment was drafted carefully. This sort 
of statutory change has been proposed at two USPTO roundtable 
events, but was met with limited congressional support.132 
However, other jurisdictions have successfully incorporated a 
statutory addition in patent law encompassing ethical 
considerations—most notably, the European Union—indicating 
the potential for successful implementation of this 
mechanism.133 
A legislative amendment would produce a desirable degree 
of uniformity, in contrast to an exclusively common law 
approach.134 The legislative drafting process would also 
theoretically be informed by ethical and scientific experts,135 
which could help appropriately tailor the language used and 
reflect scientific consensus on the ethical risks of a given 
technology. Further, since any legislative change would 
presumably be reflected in USPTO policy, the USPTO itself 
would have an opportunity to provide guidance to and refine the 
approach of its examiners during the patent prosecution 
process.136 Since the USPTO is the entity most familiar with 
                                                          
 132. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT 
MATTER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 59–64 
(2017). 
 133. See Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 61, at 13–21. 
 134. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus 
Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 396 (2008); 
Luca Anderlini et al., Statute Law or Case Law? 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 
2358, 2008). 
 135. The Legislative Process, IND. UNIV. CTR. ON REPRESENTATIVE GOV’T, 
https://corg.indiana.edu/legislative-process (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (“When 
holding a hearing, the committee will usually call expert witnesses, occasionally 
average citizens. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 136. MPEP, supra note 23. 
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potentially-patentable technology, its direct organizational 
involvement is a huge benefit.137 
However, a formal legislative amendment also has 
drawbacks, and carries the potential for a host of negative 
effects. Firstly, passage of legislative amendments is an 
extensive process, and the amount of time needed can vary 
immensely depending on their nature.138 As such, the 
mechanism may be ill-suited to the regulation of dynamic 
technologies—wherein the relevant ethical implications may 
change over time, and often rapidly.139 Such an amendment 
would also be inapplicable to patents that have already been 
issued,140 and therefore has limited regulatory potential 
concerning technologies that are already in existence, like 
CRISPR-Cas9. Furthermore, if an extended delay occurred in 
the passage of the legislative change—either initially or during 
processes of amendment—the scheme would sacrifice its 
regulatory capability with respect to any technologies developed 
during the transitional period. 
Additionally, the extent to which a resulting piece of 
legislation actually reflects public opinion is highly debatable,141 
and therefore what initially seems to be the preeminent strength 
                                                          
 137. USPTO involvement would of course occur with either common law or 
statutory revision, but it would be substantially more convenient for all involved 
parties to solicit their involvement during policy development (as would be the 
case with statutory change) rather than retroactively, as a response to litigation 
(as would be the case with a purely common law approach). 
 138. See generally ROBERT B. DOVE, ENACTMENT OF A LAW (1997), 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/download/attachments/19267597/enactlaw
.pdf?version=4&modificationDate=1446663432000&api=v2 (discussing in 
detail the Congressional procedure for enacting a law). 
 139. See generally Abbot, supra note 115 (discussing the challenges of 
regulating new technologies and possible regulatory approaches). 
 140. Retroactive federal legislation is prohibited by the Constitution itself. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall 
be passed.”). In patent law specifically, the effect of this prohibition is evidenced 
by the America Invents Act itself, which changed many substantive patent 
requirements and applies only to patents issued on or after March 16, 2013. 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 141. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 
565 (“The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites 
and organized groups representing business interests have substantial 
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest 
groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”). Gilen and 
Page’s research indicates that, outside of certain influential groups, the ability 
of public opinion to influence legislation in any meaningful respect is limited. 
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of this approach may not be as compelling as it initially appears. 
Legislation would need to incorporate at least a derivative of 
public opinion on controversial technologies142 in order to serve 
its role in protecting the patent bargain. If it is not reflective of 
public opinion, the function of incorporating consideration of the 
relevant ethical issues is severely diminished. Further, 
legislation would be slow to react to changes in public 
opinion143—if it reacted at all—which is a substantial detriment 
to regulation in light of the speed with which new 
biotechnologies are produced and patented. 
Finally, the legislative drafting necessary would be 
immensely difficult. In order to avoid unnecessary limitation on 
innovation, a potential amendment would need to provide the 
opportunity for ethical consideration, without mandating a 
rigorous course of analysis that would allow denial of a patent 
on inappropriate grounds.144 Any potential amendment would 
also need to employ terms general enough to be applicable to a 
wide array of technology, but not so general as to be inapplicable 
to an individual technology.145 Ultimately, drafting difficulty 
could prove to be the most insurmountable challenge in utilizing 
a legislative mechanism alone.146 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., Czapanskiy & Manjoo, supra note 114, at 1. 
 143. See generally sources cited supra note 134; Gilens & Page, supra note 
141 and accompanying text. 
 144. Exactly what constitutes the appropriate grounds for ethical denial or 
invalidation of a patent is beyond the scope of this Note. For a thought-
provoking analysis of some of the relevant considerations, see Bagley, A Global 
Controversy, supra note 31, at 532–47. 
 145. For example, the amendment could add a sentence to the patent eligible 
subject matter criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 101, that reads: “Patentability may be 
denied for inventions that have ethical outcomes which are yet unknown or 
have been established as undesirable.” However, even with language as general 
as this, there is the potential for judicial misuse or expansion. One potential 
solution would be multiple amendments—each addressing a particular subtype 
of invention. If this approach were preferred, the European Biotech Directive 
could provide guidance. See European Biotech Directive, supra note 61. The 
European Directive explicitly disallows patents on “mere DNA sequence 
without indication of a function,” as well as “the human body, at any stage in 
its formation or development, including germ cells,” and “plant and animal 
varieties.” Id. A similar enumeration approach could be applied to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, excluding specifically certain classes of inventions rather than broadly 
excluding those which are ethically undesirable. 
 146. See, e.g., Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 539–45. 
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2. A Revival of the Moral Utility Doctrine Provides Crucial 
Flexibility, but Risks Abuse of Judicial Discretion 
Many of the strengths of a statutory system would not exist 
in a common law approach, but the reverse is also true—common 
law has a unique set of strengths. First and foremost, common 
law is more individually tailored because of its ex post nature,147 
which is a necessary component of any regulatory scheme that 
hopes to govern in a changing landscape. Further, since common 
law is implemented on an individualized basis and evolves over 
time, it mitigates the risk of a sudden and unwarranted shift in 
the treatment of controversial biotechnologies.148 Ultimately, a 
common law regulatory mechanism does not carry the same 
risks of overbreadth or rigidity, which may make it more suitable 
to the evolving ethical landscape of biotechnology. 
The most desirable characteristic of reinstituting a form of 
case law governance is its individually-tailored nature.149 There 
is no risk of the over- or under-inclusivity inherent in statutory 
regulation,150 or of utilizing language that is applicable to only 
particular classes of technology.151 Instead, case law systems 
provide a gradual development of well-tailored doctrine, 
appropriately suited to individual factual circumstances. 
Further, evidence suggests that—over time—case law 
“converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules.”152 
This is of enormous benefit in the realm of biotechnology, where 
inventors need some level of confidence in their ability to obtain 
patents in order to justify extensive research and development 
costs. Therefore, case law could provide a balance of flexibility 
and predictability as long as future judges are able to avoid the 
                                                          
 147. See, e.g., Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13 (discussing the ex 
post nature of case law). 
 148. See sources cited supra note 134. Sudden passage of legislation could 
prove more disruptive to the industry than beneficial to the public. 
 149. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity 
Litigation over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size 
Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1945 
(2009) (discussing the benefit of individualized litigation). 
 150. Id. 
 151. For example, ethical requirements or prohibitions for agricultural 
enhancement technologies are likely to differ substantially from those that 
apply to gene editing technologies, and vice versa. 
 152. Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 134, at 379 (“[Case law’s] evolution 
converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules. . . . [S]tatutes do 
not share this evolutionary property.”). 
2018] BIOTECHNOLOGY’S GREAT DIVIDE 595 
 
fate of the old Moral Utility Doctrine and apply a modern version 
more even-handedly. 
Like a purely statutory regime, an exclusively common law 
approach to ethical consideration is not without its weaknesses. 
As the Juicy Whip court highlighted more than a decade ago, one 
concern is whether the judiciary even possesses the authority to 
invalidate patents on ethical or moral grounds—or if that is, in 
fact, the province of the legislature.153 If the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation is correct, relying on case law to regulate 
biotechnology would be legally insufficient without the 
involvement of the legislature.154 Therefore, a statutory 
component might be a necessary—rather than simply 
beneficial—element of an ethical regulatory system in patent 
law. 
Furthermore, the Moral Utility Doctrine was not applied 
with any metric of consistency, which produced a complicated 
doctrine and was arguably at least partially responsible for its 
resulting disuse.155 Inconsistent application diminishes the 
overall clarity of common law rules developed over time, 
resulting in a loss of one of the greatest potential benefits of a 
case law system.156 Convoluted precedent could also confuse 
potential patent-seekers or patent-issuers, which could then 
ultimately result in a reduced incentive for innovation.157 Since 
appropriate incentivization is crucial to sustaining the balance 
of the patent bargain, this potential pitfall cannot be overstated. 
Additionally, there are certain issues inherent in the ex post 
nature of a purely judicial regulatory scheme—as there are with 
any ex post system.158 Common law is developed in the 
                                                          
 153. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 154. More recently, this sentiment may have been echoed by the Supreme 
Court. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); see also sources cited supra note 
59 and accompanying text. 
 155. Smith, supra note 12, at 161. 
 156. Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 134, at 379 (“[Case law’s] evolution 
converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules. . . . [S]tatutes do 
not share this evolutionary property.”). 
 157. It’s difficult to imagine that inventors—or, even, prospective inventors, 
would not become frustrated with U.S. patent policy if there was a large degree 
of unpredictability in the ethical invalidation of patents. Further, sporadic and 
inconsistent invalidation of issued patents would undoubtedly be incredibly 
frustrating to the USPTO as a whole, particularly if it was not provided with 
coherent judicial guidance on how it should amend its patent issuance practices. 
 158. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13. 
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courtroom—in the face of an actual case or controversy159—
making it inherently retroactive.160 Patents on technologies that 
are potentially detrimental to society must be granted and 
utilized in the real world before a potential challenger can even 
attempt to invalidate them.161 For this reason, the case law 
regulatory mechanism falls victim to the plight of other ex post 
facto regulatory attempts, and is forced to play “catch-up” to 
rapidly-developing technologies rather than provide a 
preventative solution.162 In the case of biotechnology—where 
negative implications could manifest severely and rapidly—this 
is a tremendous deficit. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a modern Moral 
Utility Doctrine could fall victim to the varying moral and 
ethical convictions of individual judges—possibly the biggest 
risk in any potential regulatory scheme, and likely responsible 
for the original failure of the system.163 Because of the nature of 
the patent bargain,164 incorporating ethics into the patent 
process should involve some level of consensus—ideally from the 
public, but at least from some informed and impacted group of 
people—on where to draw the lines of ethical limitation. 
Conceptions of ethics and morality can vary widely between 
individuals, and judges are no exception.165 Therefore, ethically 
regulating patent issuance exclusively through case law leaves 
these determinations subject to immense variability and 
potential misuse.166  
                                                          
 159. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. For a brief but interesting discussion of the different policy 
considerations in ex ante and ex post evaluation of an issue, consider Anderlini 
et al.’s patent litigation example. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13. 
(“From an ex-ante perspective, as it is standard, the optimal breadth of the 
patent will be determined taking into account the trade-off between the 
incentives to invest in R&D, and the social cost of monopoly power exercised by 
the patent owner. Ex post, however, since the R&D investments are sunk, it is 
always socially optimal to rule in favor of the infringer and thus open the 
market to competition.”). 
 162. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 5. 
 163. See generally Smith, supra note 12. 
 164. See generally Ghosh, supra note 9, at 1316–18, 1328–29. 
 165. J.M. KIZZA, Morality and the Law, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 15 (2010) (“Although moral values are generally shared 
values in a society, the degree of sharing these values varies greatly.”). 
 166. Id. 
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C. CRAFTING AN OPTIMAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Rather than employing exclusively legislative change or 
common law revival, an ideal regulatory scheme would utilize 
components of both mechanisms in order to maximize flexibility 
and responsiveness, while minimizing inconsistency. Therefore, 
ethical regulation would be most effectively accomplished by 
combining a carefully-crafted statutory amendment—that 
leaves an appropriate amount of procedural flexibility to the 
USPTO—with a limited revival of the Moral Utility Doctrine. 
Such a regulatory scheme would allow for consideration of a 
technology’s ethical implications early in its life cycle without 
placing undue emphasis on potential negative effects, effectively 
increasing both public benefit and public protection. 
1. Characteristics of an Ideal Schema  
 In promoting this particular regulatory framework, it is 
important The ideal approach for ethical regulation in patent 
law would be to incorporate a broad statutory provision 
allowing denial of a patent on ethical grounds, while leaving 
the specific USPTO examiner protocol relatively flexible.167 
This would be most effective if coupled with a limited revival of 
the Moral Utility Doctrine, which would allow for some judicial 
oversight should the USPTO’s interpretation of the statute 
traverse too far from the current state of society’s moral and 
ethical values.168 By utilizing the legislative branch, the 
relevant agency, and the judiciary in tandem, this approach 
would provide an opportunity for flexible ethical regulation, 
wherein each component is subject to balancing and 
supervision by the others. 
In drafting the initial federal statute, generality is key. 
Ideally, Congress could look to the approach taken by the TRIPS 
Agreement and the EPC, and simply institute the opportunity 
for considerations in the vein of ordre public.169 Encouraging this 
level of abstraction limits the opportunity for political pushback 
                                                          
 167. See Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 541. 
 168. Id. (“[T]he judiciary branch . . . is perhaps best suited to engage in line 
drawing of this sort.”). 
 169. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, supra note 66; The European Patent Convention, supra note 67 
(discussing the broad approaches of two international preeminent intellectual 
property law treaties to ethical regulations). 
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from lobbying groups,170 while still establishing some discrete 
statutory requirement allowing ethical considerations into the 
patent examination room. Although very general legislation can 
be susceptible to misinterpretation, that susceptibility is 
reduced by coupling the legislation with a clear purpose,171 as 
well as judicial and agency-based oversight.172 
An important component of avoiding the pitfalls of the 
historical Moral Utility Doctrine is increasing the input of the 
USPTO in the regulatory process, as well as increasing its 
discretion in implementing examination guidelines. As the 
entity with the most intimate knowledge of the technology that 
it examines, discourse between the USPTO and the judicial 
branch is essential to the success of this regulatory system.173 If 
the governing statute was sufficiently flexible, the USPTO could 
then tailor the ethical requirements using internal procedure.174 
These internal guidelines would need to be somewhat more 
                                                          
 170. By contrast—as in, if legislation were to be enacted on a technology-by-
technology basis—Congress could be subject to immense pressure from lobbying 
groups backing certain technologies, even if those technologies in fact do present 
grave ethical risks. Therefore, that approach is politically undesirable. Bagley, 
Patent First, supra note 46, at 541 (“Alternatively . . . though likely more 
hazardous from a political standpoint, Congress could enact specific, subject 
matter-based legislation.”). 
 171. In particular, a record of legislative history explaining the statutes 
purpose may be of use in subsequent judicial interpretation. See Clarence 
Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Federal Statutes, U. PENN. L. REV. 
158 (1925). 
 172. But see Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 541 (arguing that a 
statute drafted with general language could, in effect, cause a reversion to the 
original Moral Utility Doctrine scheme). Undoubtedly, this is a possibility. The 
only hope for avoiding such a repeat history would be clear communication 
between Congress and the judiciary as the statute is interpreted (and, perhaps, 
additional, technology-specific legislation if necessary to clarify), coupled with 
continued feedback from the USPTO. 
 173. This relationship could be informal—in large part, in order to respect 
the talismanic “separation of powers”—but would be essential in avoiding 
reversion to the old Moral Utility approach. 
 174. More than likely, this would involve incorporating guidelines for the 
treatment of the ethical implications of a given technology into the USPTO’s 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), which “outlines the 
procedures carried out by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.” It serves as 
a handbook for patent examiners during the patent application process, and 
“describes all of the laws and regulations that must be followed in the 
examination of U.S. patent applications, and articulates in detail their 
application to an enormous variety of different factual situations.” Patent Lens, 
CAMBIA, http://www.bios.net/daisy/patentlens/2595.html. See generally MPEP, 
supra note 23. 
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technologically specific than the original federal statute in order 
to be useful, and would ideally be informed by both professional 
society guidelines175 and public opinion.176 Utilizing the relevant 
agency in this way is beneficial in part because agency policy can 
be generated and amended more quickly than legislation, and in 
part because of the USPTO’s unique technological expertise. 
Ultimately, involvement of the USPTO in developing 
examination procedure would help to offset any of the potential 
detriments of a very general statutory ethical regulation 
allowance, and its communication with the judiciary would help 
minimize the risks of inappropriate or unintended judicial 
interpretation. 
Finally, the ideal system would incorporate some level of 
reinvigoration of the Moral Utility Doctrine. Since litigation is a 
necessary and fundamental component of the patent system, 
judges need a way to evaluate the validity of issued patents on 
all relevant grounds—including ethical grounds, were the 
opportunity to be added. Furthermore, judges are uniquely 
qualified to perform difficult “line drawing,” and therefore would 
play a necessary role in defining the parameters of which 
inventions are ethically permissible.177 Additionally, 
incorporating judicial opinion, by default, incorporates the 
perspective of the general public, since judges are frequently no 
                                                          
 175. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 85. The National 
Academy of Science guidelines on gene editing could—and, arguably, should—
be instructive in amending the MPEP, as they are the preeminent ethical 
guidelines on gene editing at present. The National Academy of Science 
recommends abstaining from genome editing for purposes of “enhancement,” 
and cautions against germline editing without “ongoing reassessment and 
public participation.” See Report Highlights, supra note 87. The USPTO might 
incorporate these recommendations by instructing examiners to deny claims 
that could encompass these activities. In practice, this would create a system 
where the National Academy of Science informs USPTO patentability policy 
similarly to the way that the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) 
informs National Institutes of Health research policy. See generally supra notes 
91–93. In this way, the USPTO would give professional consensus guidelines 
legal force. 
 176. Informal (or “notice-and-comment”) rulemaking is a mechanism by 
which the USPTO could incorporate public opinion in this internal policy. See 
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (2015), 
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2578. This style of rulemaking involves 
proposing a rule in the Federal Register, and responding to comments from the 
general public. Id. Further, Congress could—if it so desired—require the 
USPTO to entertain even more public participation than required by informal 
rulemaking (or the USPTO itself could choose to do so). Id. 
 177. See J.M. Kizza, supra note 168. 
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more knowledgeable about a particular niche technology than 
the average layperson.178 In many ways, this is as close to a 
representation of public opinion as can be realistically achieved 
in a representative democracy. Therefore—as long as the other 
components of the proposed policy continue to function in a 
complementary capacity—a “modern Moral Utility Doctrine” 
could develop over time without a disproportionate risk of 
judicial overstep. 
2. Necessary Limitations: A Balancing Act  
In promoting this particular regulatory framework, it is 
important to acknowledge the necessary limitations, as well as 
the policy goals that should govern its implementation. This 
system is designed to require consideration of a technology’s 
ethical implications, while maintaining some degree of 
analytical flexibility—an equilibrium that should be continually 
re-calibrated to reflect society’s evolving moral and ethical 
convictions.179 Therefore, it will be necessary to re-analyze and 
re-incorporate public opinion at various points in the future, 
particularly after watershed developments in a particular 
field—like the discovery of the CRISPR-Cas9 system. 
Additionally, introducing any new considerations into 
patent prosecution—ethical or otherwise—necessitates a 
reexamination of the crucial patent law “balancing act.” At every 
turn, we must strive to serve the constitutional policy goal of 
promoting innovation,180 while ensuring that the public is 
adequately benefited and protected.181 If our ethical restrictions 
become too severe and patents become too illusive for the 
inventor, innovation is disincentivized and, ultimately, the 
public suffers.182 Similarly, if we continue to operate without any 
                                                          
 178. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, YALE L.J. 2 
(2010). 
 179. The patent process truly is a bargain, in which the public is a 
participant. As such, their inclusion in negotiation should be requisite. See 
Ghosh, supra note 9; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text. Since 
public opinion evolves over time, renegotiations are necessary. 
 180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 181. For a discussion of this central policy consideration—as well as many 
others at play in patent law—see Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
 182. In this instance, society experiences a decreased level of innovation as 
compared to a less-restrictive patent law environment. Since innovations are 
often beneficial, this results in a net decrease in public benefit. 
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ethical constraints at all, the public will also suffer.183 The 
appropriate balance of incentive and protection lies somewhere 
in the middle—it is as elusive as it is desirable, making 
perpetual reevaluation of a necessary component of any 
successful patent system. 
D. REVISITING CRISPR-CAS9 
Proposing an ideal regulatory scheme is significantly easier 
than employing it in practice. The CRISPR system is an 
exemplary biotechnology around which to debate patentability 
because it highlights many of the ethical dilemmas associated 
with gene editing technology. However, CRISPR also illustrates 
the complexity of attempting to apply patentability restrictions 
to technologies that have a wide array of applications. For 
example, is possible to use CRISPR-Cas9 to edit human 
embryos,184 but it can just as easily be used to enhance crop 
yield185 or alter flower color.186 Some of these uses are clearly 
more contentious than others. Should we deny patent protection 
to the entire technology because of a handful of its applications? 
The answer is not simple. Some technologies would almost 
certainly be barred by the proposed regulatory framework: for 
example, those encompassing biological weapons.187 In this case, 
the patent “balancing act” would tip plainly in favor of societal 
disapprobation—whatever benefit these technologies provide is 
                                                          
 183. Contrastingly, refusal to restrict patent issuance on ethical grounds 
allows technologies with potential negative effects to run rampant, and their 
innovation is encouraged because it appears to be condoned by both society and 
the government. See Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 535 (indicating that 
the government places its “imprimatur on [a particular technology] via a patent 
grant”). 
 184. See, e.g., Puping Liang et al., supra note 4. 
 185. See Dom Galeon, Geneticists Have Used CRISPR Gene Editing to Create 
Crops that Grow More Food, FUTURISM (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://futurism.com/geneticists-have-used-crispr-gene-editing-to-create-crops-
that-grow-more-food/. 
 186. See David Nield, For the First Time, CRISPR Has Been Used to 
Dramatically Change Flower Colour, SCIENCEALERT (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://www.sciencealert.com/now-scientists-are-using-crispr-to-change-the-
colour-of-flowers. 
 187. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,523,478 (claiming a “rifle-launched non-
lethal cargo dispenser” that can be filled with cartridges containing 
“chemical/biological agents,” among other substances). This patent was actually 
issued, and was the subject of substantial ethical controversy. See, e.g., Erika 
Check, US Army Attacked over Published Patent for ‘Bioweapons Grenade’, 
NATURE (June 19, 2003), https://www.nature.com/articles/423789a. 
602 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
unlikely to warrant the risk of their misuse. A more borderline 
instance might involve a claim encompassing human neural 
material,188 wherein the potential medical benefits may or may 
not outweigh concerns about autonomy and morality. To be sure, 
this kind of marginal technology presents some opportunity for 
judicial overstep or abuse189—a variance in human conviction 
that no regulatory system can entirely preclude. In the case of 
CRISPR-Cas9, however, it is unlikely that professional 
consensus,190 international approaches,191 or current public 
opinion192 would instruct barring patentability entirely. Instead, 
subjecting CRISPR to the recommended framework is still likely 
to indicate that it merits patent protection—the technology has 
                                                          
 188. The use of human neural material is often debated by bioethicists in 
the context of chimeras. See Allison Harvey & Brian Salter, Anticipatory 
Governance: Bioethical Expertise for Human/Animal Chimeras, 21 SCI. AS 
CULTURE 291 (2012) (discussing the hypothetical “human neuron mouse,” 
which is “a mouse in which the brain neurons [are] replace [sic] with human 
neural stem cells”). Whether or not the use of human neural material is 
excluded from patentability by the Patent Act remains uncertain, and hinges 
on whether the use of such material is seen as creating a claim that is “directed 
to a human organism.” See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human 
organism.”). 
 189. This “abuse” refers to judges imparting their own moral and ethical 
convictions into legal decision-making. In such instances, a judge might 
invalidate a patent that society would collectively choose to uphold. 
 190. Although it has issued cautionary statements about certain 
applications—namely, enhancement and germline modification—the National 
Academy of Science appears to be supportive of gene editing in certain contexts. 
See Report Highlights, supra note 87. 
 191. For example, even Europe has issued patents that cover CRISPR 
technology, although a struggle persists as to ownership rights. See, e.g., Kelly 
Servick, Broad Institute Takes a Hit in European CRISPR Patent Struggle, SCI. 
(Jan. 18, 2018, 3:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/01/broad-
institute-takes-hit-european-crispr-patent-struggle. In general, the European 
Union appears to be moving toward relaxing its restrictions on the use of gene 
editing. See Alex Dale, European Court Supports the Softening of CRISPR Gene 
Editing Rules, LABIOTECH (Jan. 22, 2018), https://labiotech.eu/crispr-gene-
editing-court/. 
 192. At present, the public also appears to be generally supportive of gene 
editing technology. See Stephen M. Weissberg et al., A CRISPR New World: 
Attitudes in the Public Toward Innovation in Human Genetic Modification, 5 
FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 1 (2017) (“Respondents supported genetic 
modification research, although demographic variables influenced these 
attitudes—conservatives, women, African-Americans, and older respondents, 
while supportive, were more cautious than liberals, men, other ethnicities, and 
younger respondents.”) (emphasis added). 
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too many ethically permissible applications to warrant total 
denunciation in the name of a select few, which could be 
addressed individually.193 Therefore, this Note does not purport 
to recommend total condemnation of any technology that 
implicates ethical concerns. Instead, it simply attempts to 
encourage discourse—involving all participants in the patent 
bargain—about the ethical risks we are willing to accept in 
exchange for technological progress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite other approaches taken internationally, the current 
U.S. patent system provides no opportunity to consider the 
ethical implications of a technology during the patent process. 
There has never been a statutory basis for doing so,194 and the 
common law doctrine that once allowed such considerations to 
be the basis of patent invalidation—the Moral Utility Doctrine—
has been dormant for at least a decade.195 To date, its status 
remains uncertain. Current biotechnological developments have 
brought once-dystopian ethical concerns to the forefront of public 
discourse, providing a renewed opportunity to establish a 
relationship between ethics and patent law in the U.S. 
The ramifications of a technology are necessary 
considerations in patent law because patent issuance is a 
bargaining process— the public must receive a true net benefit 
in exchange its recognition of a patentee’s limited monopoly 
right. Further, evaluating an emerging technology’s ethical 
implications during the patent process—rather than after they 
have achieved mainstream commercial use—is a uniquely 
proactive way to regulate rapidly-evolving technologies before 
they impact the general public. However, effective evaluation of 
the ethical considerations inherent to new biotechnologies 
cannot be adequately accomplished by preventative legislation 
or common law supervision alone. Instead, a blended approach 
involving a legislative provision that mimics international 
                                                          
 193. For example, a would-be CRISPR patentee could be required to 
disclaim certain ethically controversial subject matter—such as use of the 
technology in vertebrate animals—in a similar way that patentees are required 
to disclaim subject matter encompassing a human organism. See generally 
Crouch, supra note 35. 
 194. Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 532 (“[T]he United States has 
never had a statutory morality exception to patentability.”). 
 195. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
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approaches and accommodates discretion in agency policy, 
combined with a limited revival of a modernized Moral Utility 
Doctrine, strikes the appropriate balance between incentivizing 
innovation and protecting the public interest. Whether patent 
protection for CRISPR-Cas9 and its progeny would ultimately be 
disallowed by this schema is speculative, but it creates a 
regulatory environment equipped to handle the complex ethical 
implications of 21st Century biotechnology—making it an ideal 
approach to U.S. patent law for the years to come. 
